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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1959
tially eliminates this problem on future appeals by making an appeal
to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County from the orders
of the Board of Liquor Control permissive, instead of mandatory.
Thus, an order of the Board of Liquor Control denying a permit may
be appealed to the court of common pleas of the county in which the
place of business of the applicant is located or the county in which
the applicant is a resident.
MAURICE S. CULP
AGENCY
Because of the lack of significant opinions rendered on Agency
during the period covered by this Survey, Mr. Hugh Ross has not
submitted an article this year.
THE EDITORS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Four cases of disciplinary action were reported last year, three
from Cuyahoga' and one from Stark County.2 Two attorneys were
publicly reprimanded, one was indefinitely suspended from practice,
and one was permanently disbarred.
The cases give some further definition of the term "misconduct"
which, by Ohio Supreme Court Rule XXVII, warrants disciplinary
action. The most interesting of these' concerned an attorney repre-
senting the plaintiff in a divorce action. The attorney had been told
by his client, before the petition was filed, that he was living in a state
of "either bigamy or adultery," and that he intended to continue to
do so. Therefore, the attorney knew that the divorce action was
without merit and knew that his client was continuing to act in viola-
tion of a criminal statute.4 The Board of Commission on Grievances
and Discipline found "that [the attorney] failed to terminate a pro-
fessional relationship in the face of his client's continued wrongdoing
and performed improper service by instituting an admittedly unmeri-
torious suit."5  The supreme court said that these acts constituted
misconduct and approved the board's recommendation of discipline
for the attorney.
1. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Wilkerson, 168 Ohio St. 478, 156 N.E.2d 136 (1959); Cleveland
Bar Ass'n v. Vann, 168 Ohio St. 481, 155 N.E.2d 922 (1959); Adams v. Fleck, 154 N.E.2d
794 (Ohio P. Ct. 1958).
2. Stark County Bar Ass'n v. Beyoglides, 169 Ohio St 201, 158 N.X.2d 361 (1959).
3. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Wilkerson, 168 Ohio St. 478, 156 NE.2d 136 (1959).
4. OsIo REv. CODE § 2905.08.
5. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Wilkerson, 168 Ohio St. 478, 156 N.X.2d 136, 137 (1958).
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The misconduct here consisted not just of instituting the divorce
action, but also of maintaining a "professional relationship" with the
client. It is, of course, clear that an attorney may not aid a client in
the perpetration of a crime, which is to be distinguished from repre-
senting a client who has committed a crime where the criminal ac-
tivity has ceased. But the doctrine of this case forbids the mainte-
nance of a professional relationship with a client who continues his
criminal activity, even though the legal service does not aid in the
crime. Stated another way, it means that one who insists on continu-
ing a life of crime is not entitled to legal counsel. The opinion does
not discuss the purpose of the doctrine, but presumably it is based
upon the unseemliness of such a relationship, the necessity of uphold-
ing the honor and dignity of the profession, and the desire to encour-
age obedience to the law by denying vital services to the continuing
criminal.6 It should be noted that in the case at hand the attorney
knew positively from his client that the client was continuing the
criminal acts; the decision does not deal with the situation where the
attorney has something less than positive knowledge of the continu-
ing activity. Perhaps the decision does not mean to deny all legal
service to the criminal under these circumstances, but there is no sug-
gestion in the opinion that any type of professional service would be
proper. This doctrine plainly needs further study and clarification.
The court did not indicate how serious it considered this miscon-
duct of maintaining a professional relationship to be under these cir-
cumstances, for although it approved the board's recommendation of
indefinite suspension of the attorney, he was also guilty of filing an
admittedly unmeritorious suit, of failing to account properly for a
client's funds, of instituting litigation contrary to the wishes of a
client, and of failing to prosecute properly the case of another client.
The court said that it was the cumulative effect of these acts of mis-
conduct that warranted the discipline, and that it did not make any
determination as to whether the conduct in any one of the acts might
in and of itself be sufficient to justify the discipline.
In the above case, and in Cleveland Bar Association v. Fann 7 the
misconduct consisted of failing to account properly for clients' funds.
In both cases, the full amount of the fund had been returned to the
client before disciplinary proceedings were instituted, but both attor-
neys were found to have misconducted themselves and were disci-
plined. Since the circumstances of these cases are not fully laid out
6. Canons of Professional Ethics § 16, entitled "Restraining Clients from Improprieties,"
provides:
"A lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from
doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with refer-
ence to their conduct towards courts, judicial offices, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If
a client persists in such wrong-doing the lawyer should terminate their relation."
The impropriety or wrongdoing contemplated by this canon does not seem to be the type pres-
ent in this case.
7. 168 Ohio St. 481, 155 N.E.2d 922 (1959).
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in the opinions, the cases give only a general indication of what the
court considers to be accounting improper to the extent that discipline
is warranted. In one case, that of the attorney with the adulterous
client discussed above,8 the attorney had received $1,000 from his
client, to be paid to the vendor of real estate which the client was
buying. The purchase agreement failed and the client demanded the
return of the $1,000, which the attorney was holding separately from
his own funds, but the attorney refused to return it. He claimed to
have an attorney's lien on the fund, which the board found did not
exist, and he returned it only after embezzlement charges were
brought against him.
In the second case,' $257 had been given the attorney, again to
be paid to the vendor of real estate being purchased by the client;
the attorney apparently used this money and refused initially to pay
the vendor or to repay the client. Upon further demand, the attor-
ney made reimbursement to the client. The court held that the
board's recommendation of indefinite suspension was unduly severe
under the circumstances, and reduced the discipline to a public
reprimand.
In another case,10 a probate court reprimanded two members of a
law firm, who jointly represented conflicting interests in a matter be-
fore the court, remarking that the case contained echoes of In re
Estate of Wright." Their conduct was criticized primarily because
they had represented the deceased in devising a plan to limit as much
as possible his wife's inheritance from him and then, upon his death,
represented the widow and children in connection with their rights in
the estate. The court pointed out that the attorneys' obligation to
the deceased client was not terminated by his death and that they
should have completely divorced themselves from any action designed
to protect the widow.
The fourth disciplinary case' 2 resulted in permanent disbarment
of an attorney on findings of misconduct under some eight different
counts. No details of the acts of misconduct were stated.
In all but one of the surveyed cases the disciplinary procedure fol-
lowed was that under Ohio Supreme Court Rule XXVII. In the one
special case, that of conflict of interest discussed above,' 3 a reprimand
was delivered sua sponte by the Probate Court of Cuyahoga County
in connection with an order requiring the reprimanded attorneys to
turn over to the court an asset of an estate held by them. The testi-
8. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Wilkerson, 168 Ohio St. 478, 156 N.E.2d 136 (1959).
9. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Vann, 168 Ohio St. 481, 155 N.2d 922 (1959).
10. Adams v. Fleck, 154 N.B.2d 794 (Ohio P. Ct. 1958).
11. 123 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954), Sonenfield, Attorneys at Law, Survey of Ohio Law
-1955, 7 WEST. REs. L. R v. 230, 235 (1956); 165 Ohio St. 15, 133 N.E.2d 350 (1956),
Sonenfield, Attorneys at Law, Survey of Ohio Law - 1956, 8 WEST. REs. L. REV. 250 (1957).
12. Stark County Bar Ass'n v. Beyoglides, 169 Ohio St. 201, 158 Nl..2d 361 (1959).
13. Adams v. Fleck, 154 N.B.2d 794 (Ohio P. Ct. 1958).
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